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Abstract—We study Nash bargaining and proportional fair-
ness for a feasible set of signal-to-interference ratios (SIR).
The SIR is modeled by an axiomatic framework of logarithmi-
cally convex (log-convex) interference functions. Classical results
cannot be applied directly since the feasible SIR set is not
necessarily compact convex. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper
is to show that for certain strictly log-convex utility sets, the
Nash solution is unique and corresponds to proportionally fair
resource allocation. Then, we derive conditions under which
the proportionally fair optimum is bounded, and an optimizer
exists. This depends on the interference coupling between the
users. Then, we show under which condition such an optimizer
is unique. Finally, we analyze the feasible SIR set. Conditions
are derived under which the set is strictly log-convex. If this is
fulﬁlled, and if a solution exists, then Nash bargaining over the
feasible SIR set is equivalent to proportional fairness, and the
solution is unique.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication systems use cooperative resource
allocation in order to efﬁciently exploit the available power and
bandwidth. Cooperation is often facilitated by centralized ar-
chitectures, like cellular systems. But cooperation can also be
useful between decentralized system components. By letting
users cooperate, they can efﬁciently distribute their resources
while trying to avoid interference.
Consider a wireless system, with K  2 users from an
index set K = f1;2;:::;Kg. If the users are coupled by
interference, then there is a general trade-off between the
users’ utilities u1;:::;uK. By U we denote the set of all
feasible utility vectors u = [u1;:::;uK]T. A fundamental
problem is to ﬁnd a suitable compromise between the users.
To this end, there are various resource allocation strategies,
based on different notions of “fairness” or “efﬁciency”.
In this paper we focus on the particular strategy of pro-
portional fairness [1], which is closely linked to the game-
theoretic strategy of Nash bargaining [2]–[4]. The main dif-
ference to previous work is the way how the utility set U
is modeled. Our results are not based on a given utility
set. We use the framework of interference functions [5] to
explicitly model the inter-user interference as a function of
the transmission powers. The performance (utility) of each
user is characterized by its signal-to-interference ratio (SIR).
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The utility set U is determined by the underlying interference
functions.
This approach is motivated by the particular needs of a
wireless communication system, where the utility set can
crucially depend on the way how users are coupled by
interference. The SIR is an important performance measure
because the available bandwidth of a wireless system is often
best exploited by letting the users interfere with each other in a
controlled way (see e.g. [6], [7]). By analyzing SIR regions we
gain deeper insight into the behavior of interference-coupled
systems. We also learn to better understand how the structure
of the region depends on the transmission powers of the K
users.
However, such a “physical-layer-aware” approach also com-
plicates the task of resource allocation. Standard properties of
the utility set, like convexity or compactness cannot be taken
for granted. In this paper we show fundamental results for cer-
tain non-convex and non-compact utility sets. In particular, we
investigate under which conditions classical results for Nash
bargaining and proportional fairness are still valid. But before
giving a detailed problem formulation we brieﬂy summarize
some known results and concepts from the literature.
A. Nash Bargaining and Proportional Fairness
We begin with some notational conventions: Matrices and
vectors are denoted by bold capital letters and bold lowercase
letters, respectively. Let y be a vector, then yl = [y]l is the
lth component. Likewise, Amn = [A]mn is a component of
the matrix A. The notation y  0 means that yl  0 for all
components l. y  x means component-wise inequality. The
set of non-negative reals is denoted as R+. The set of positive
reals is denoted as R++. y 6= x means that inequality holds
for at least one component.
Deﬁnition 1. A set U  RK
++ is said to be (downward)-
comprehensive if for all u 2 U and u0 2 RK
++,
0 < u0  u =) u0 2 U : (1)
A bargaining solution is the unanimous agreement on cer-
tain utilities u = [u1;:::;uK]T from a utility set U. The Nash
bargaining solution (NBS) corresponds to a Pareto-optimal
point '(U) characterized by a set of axioms (Nash axioms).
A more detailed description is given in Section II-A.
If the region U  RK
++ is compact1 convex comprehensive,
1In this paper, compact and closed are deﬁned relatively in RK
++. A set
U  RK
++ is said to be relatively closed in RK
++ if there exists a closed set
A  RK such that U = A
T
RK
++. Technically, U  RK
++ means that all
users are active. This will be discussed in more detail later.
1then the unique NBS fulﬁlling the Nash axioms is obtained
by maximizing the product of utilities, i.e.,
max
u2U
Y
k2K
uk : (2)
Since logmax
Q
k uk = maxlog
Q
k uk = max
P
k loguk,
the optimizer (2) can be found equivalently by solving
max
u2U
X
k2K
loguk : (3)
This strategy is also known as proportional fairness (PF).
It was originally introduced in the context of stability and
fairness of rate control algorithms for communication networks
[1] (see also [8]). This connection between NBS and PF was
already observed in [1], [9] (see also [10]–[12]).
If U is not compact convex then it is a priori unclear whether
the maximum (3), respectively (2), exists. If it exists, then it
is unclear whether this optimum really is the Nash bargaining
solution characterized by the axiomatic framework.
In the following we will show that it is indeed possible
to extend the concepts of Nash bargaining and proportional
fairness to certain non-convex non-compact sets while pre-
serving their main properties like existence and uniqueness of
an optimizer. One such set is the the SIR region, which will
be introduced in the next section.
B. Wireless Utility Model – The Feasible SIR Set
In a wireless system, the users’ utilities can strongly depend
on the underlying physical layer, so the SIR is an important
measure for the link performances. In most of the paper
(except for Section II), the utility under consideration is the
SIR
SIRk(p) =
pk
Ik(p)
; k 2 K : (4)
The function Ik(p) yields the interference power experienced
by the kth user. It is a function of the transmission powers
p = [p1;:::;pK]T. Many common performance measures,
like capacity or bit error rate, can be modeled as one-to-one
mappings of the SIR.
Note, that the effective path gain of user k can be incorpo-
rated in the function Ik(p) as an additional scaling factor. In
this case, (4) is the ratio of the received power to interference
power.
In order to model the interference, we use the axiomatic
framework proposed in [5].
Deﬁnition 2. A function I : RK
+ 7! R+ is said to be an
interference function if it fulﬁlls the axioms:
A1 (non-negativeness) I(p)  0
A2 (scale invariance) I(p) = I(p) 8 2 R+
A3 (monotonicity) I(p)  I(p0) if p  p0.
In order to rule out the trivial case I(p) = 0 we make an
additional assumption:
There exists a p0 > 0 such that I(p0) > 0 : (5)
It was shown in [5] that (5) implies I(p) > 0 for all p 2 RK
++.
The axioms A1, A2, A3 are similar to Yates framework of
standard interference functions [13]. However, there are some
important differences. In [13] scalability J(p) > J(p), for
 > 1, was required in order for J to be a standard interference
function. This property was motivated by the presence of
a constant noise power 2
n. A simple example is the linear
function J(p) = pTv + 2
n, where v  0 is a vector of
interference coupling coefﬁcients.
In order to model noise with the framework A1–A3, a
more explicit approach is required. We can deﬁne an extended
power vector p =
h
p

2
i
, which yields an interference function
I(p) = J(p). The function I(p) fulﬁlls A1–A3. If I is strictly
monotonic with respect to p
K+1 and 2 is constant, then J(p)
is a standard interference function. Any standard interference
function can be modeled this way (see e.g. [5] for further
details).
In this paper, however, the problem under consideration
is studied in the absence of noise. This corresponds to the
case where the transmission powers are unconstrained. This
not only simpliﬁes the problem, it also has the advantage
of bringing out clearly the effects of interference coupling
on the feasible SIR region and the resulting proportional fair
operating point. Such an approach has a longstanding tradition
in power control theory [14], where fundamental results were
found in the absence of power constraints. Another example is
the diversity-multiplexing tradeoff [15] which was also derived
for the high-SNR regime. Analyzing a problem for high SNR
often helps to better understand its analytical structure. This
provides a basis for future extensions, where noise and power
constraints are possibly included.
The axiomatic framework A1–A3 was motivated by speciﬁc
power control problems, like [16]. But it is also useful for
characterizing other types of coupling effects. An example is
the min-max optimum
C() = inf
p>0

max
k2K
k  Ik(p)
pk

: (6)
The function C() is an indicator for the feasibility of SIR
values  = [1;:::;K]T. We have C()  1 if and only if
for any  > 0 there exists a p > 0 such that SIRk(p) 
k   , for all k 2 K (see e.g. [5] for more details). The
feasible SIR region is the sub-level set
S = f 2 RK
++ : C()  1g : (7)
Boundary points of S are characterized by C() = 1. If the
inﬁmum (6) is not attained then the boundary point  is only
achievable in an asymptotic sense, as discussed in Section VII.
Observe that the function C() fulﬁlls the axioms A1–
A3, so it can formally be regarded as an “interference func-
tion”. Note, that this notion of interference abstracts away
from its original physical meaning. Because of the properties
A1,A2,A3, the set S is downward comprehensice (cf. Def-
inition 1). It was shown in [17] that in fact every compact
comprehensive utility set from RK
++ can be expressed as a
sub-level set of an interference function.
2C. Problem Formulation and Contributions
Consider the problem of proportionally fair resource alloca-
tion (3), where the utility set is the SIR region S. Exploiting
 
P
k logk =
P
k log
 1
k , the problem can be formulated
as
PF(I) = inf
2S
X
k2K
log
 1
k : (8)
Using the parametrization (4), this can be rewritten as
PF(I) = inf
p2P
K X
k=1
log
Ik(p)
pk
(9)
where P is the set of power vectors. Since the SIR (4) is
invariant with respect to a scaling of p, we can deﬁne P as
P = fp 2 RK
++ : kpk1 = 1g : (10)
Note, that the optimization (8) is over the SIR region directly,
whereas (9) is over the set of power vectors. This approach
allows to model the impact of the physical layer on the
interference. For example, I(p) can depend on p in a non-
linear way. Some examples will be given later in Section III-A.
Remark 1. For certain systems operating in a high-SNR
regime, it is customary to approximate the data rate as
log(1 + SIR)  log(SIR) (see e.g. [18]). Then, our problem
(9) can be interpreted as the maximization of the sum rate P
k log(1 + SIRk).
The SIR region S is generally non-convex and non-compact
(because no power constraints are assumed), so it is not clear
whether the frameworks of Nash bargaining and proportional
fairness can be applied or not. It is even not clear whether the
inﬁmum (9) is actually attained.
Nash bargaining for non-convex regions was studied, e.g.
in [19]–[26]. However, these papers either deal with differ-
ent types of regions (typically, only comprehensiveness is
required, in which case uniqueness may be lost) or additional
axioms are introduced in order to guarantee uniqueness. Also,
most of this work was done in a context other than wireless
communications.
In Section II we will extend the conventional Nash bar-
gaining framework to a certain class of logarithmically convex
(log-convex) utility sets. This is motivated by the special needs
of a wireless communication system, where such regions can
occur (examples will follow). In this respect, our approach
is not directly linked to the previous game-theoretic literature
[19]–[26].
Note, that the results of Section II apply to arbitrary log-
convex utility sets. In Section III and in what follows, we
will focus on a particular log-convex utility. Namely, we will
study the SIR region resulting from log-convex interference
functions. This section builds on recent results [27], where
the structure of log-convex interference functions was investi-
gated. We exploit that the interference coupling in the system
can be characterized by a K  K dependency matrix D.
Assuming log-convex interference functions, we will study
the existence and uniqueness of a proportionally fair optimizer
(9). The following fundamental questions will be addressed:
1) Boundedness: When is PF(I) >  1 fulﬁlled?
2) Existence: When does an optimizer ^ p > 0 exist such
that PF(I) =
P
k logIk(^ p)=^ pk?
3) Uniqueness: When is ^ p > 0 the unique optimizer?
Property PF(I) >  1 is necessary for the existence of ^ p,
but not sufﬁcient. This justiﬁes a separate treatment of problem
1) in Section IV. It is shown that PF(I) >  1 implies the
existence of a row or column permutation such that D has
a strictly positive main diagonal. An additional condition is
provided under which the converse holds as well.
In Section V, the existence of an optimizer ^ p > 0 is studied.
Under certain monotonicity conditions, an optimizer exists, if
and only if there exist row and column permutations such
that the resulting matrix is block-irreducible [28] and its main
diagonal is positive. Otherwise, no Pareto optimal operating
point can be found.
In Section VI we show that the uniqueness of an existing
optimizer depends on the structure of the matrix DD
T.
Finally, in Section VII we study under which condition
the SIR feasible set is strictly log-convex. If this is fulﬁlled,
and if an optimizer exists, then it follows from the results
of Section II that the proportionally fair operating point is
obtained as the single-valued Nash bargaining solution.
II. NASH BARGAINING FOR LOG-CONVEX UTILITY SETS
We start by brieﬂy reviewing some fundamentals of Nash
bargaining for compact comprehensive convex utility sets from
RK
++. Then, we will extend this framework to certain non-
compact log-convex utility sets.
A. The Conventional Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
One of the most popular bargaining strategies is the (sym-
metric) Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), which was proposed
by Nash [2] (see also [3], [4], [29]). The applicability of the
NBS for resource sharing in communication networks was
studied in [9]–[11], [30]–[32].
Let DK denote the family of all compact comprehensive
convex utility sets from RK
++. For any U 2 DK, the NBS is
the unique (single-valued) solution outcome '(U) that fulﬁlls
the following axioms.
 Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO). The users should not be
able to collectively improve upon the solution outcome,
i.e.,
'(U) 2 fu 2 U : there is no u0 2 U with u0 > ug :
 Symmetry (SYM). If U is symmetric then the outcome
only depends on the bargaining strategy and not on the
identities of the users, i.e., '1(U) =  = 'K(U). This
does not mean that the game is necessarily symmetric,
but rather that all users have the same priorities.
 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). If the feasi-
ble set shrinks but the solution outcome remains feasible,
then the solution outcome of the smaller set should be the
same, i.e.,
'(U) 2 U0, with U0  U =) '(U0) = '(U) :
3 Scale Transformation Covariance (STC). The optimiza-
tion strategy is invariant with respect to a component-
wise scaling of the region. That is, for any U 2 DK and
a 2 RK with a > 0 and a  U 2 DK, where ‘’ means
component-wise multiplication, we have
'(a  U) = a  '(U) :
For any convex set U 2 DK, these four axioms are fulﬁlled
by a unique solution, obtained by solving (2), respectively (3).
Nash introduced the bargaining problem in [2] for convex
compact sets and two players. Later, in [33] he extended this
work by introducing the concept of a disagreement point (also
known as threat point), which is the solution outcome in case
that the players are unable to reach a unanimous agreement.
Some “non-standard” variations of the Nash bargaining prob-
lem exist, including non-convex regions (see e.g. [19], [22]–
[24]) and problem formulations without disagreement point
(see e.g. [4] and the references therein).
In this paper we assume that there is no disagreement point.
Therefore, the axiom STC differs slightly from its common
deﬁnition used in game-theoretical literature (e.g. [3]), where
an additional invariance with respect to a translation of the
region is required.
Omitting the disagreement point is justiﬁed by the special
structure of the problem under consideration. We are interested
in utility sets for which the existence of a solution is always
guaranteed. From a mathematical point of view, zero utilities
must be excluded because of the possibility of singularities
(SIR tending to inﬁnity). However, from a technical perspec-
tive this corresponds to a bargaining game with disagreement
point zero. The results are also relevant for certain games with
non-zero disagreement point: if the zero of the utility scales
does not matter then we can reformulate the game within a
transformed coordinate system.
B. Extension of NBS to Log-Convex Regions
In the remainder of this paper, we will drop the custom-
ary assumption that U is compact convex. We will extend
the above framework to the broader class of log-convex
sets. Consider the bijective continuous mapping log(u) =
[logu1;:::;loguK]T, where u 2 U  RK
++.
Deﬁnition 3. We say that a set U  RK
++ is log-convex if the
image set
Log(U) = fq = log(u) : u 2 Ug (11)
is convex.
Deﬁnition 4. By ST we denote the family of all closed
comprehensive utility sets U  RK
++ such that Log(U) is a
strictly convex set in RK. By ST c we denote the family of
all U 2 ST that are additionally bounded, thus compact.
For bounded sets from ST c, it was shown in [34], that
the unique solution fulﬁlling the Nash axioms is always the
optimizer of (2), respectively (3). Here, we consider a possibly
unbounded set U 2 ST , for which the results [34] cannot be
applied directly. We ﬁrst need to study under which condition
an optimizer exists. To this end, we introduce an auxiliary set
U() = U \ G() (12)
where
G() =

 2 RK
++ :
X
k2K k  
	
;  > 0 : (13)
Unlike U, the set U() is always contained in ST c. So there
is a unique Nash bargaining solution '
 
U()

, given as the
optimizer of the Nash product [34]. The associated utilities
are denoted by u().
Theorem 1. Let U 2 ST . Problem (2), respectively (3), has
a unique solution ^ u if and only if there exists a ^  such that
for all   ^ 
'
 
U()

= argmax
u2U()
Y
k2K
uk = u(^ ) : (14)
Then, ^ u = u(^ ).
Proof. Assume that there is a ^  such that (14) holds for an
arbitrary   ^ . Then, u(^ ) is the solution of (2) for the set
U(). The solution is unique because U() 2 ST c. With
U()  U, we have
max
u2U()
Y
k2K
uk  sup
u2U
Y
k2K
uk =: C : (15)
We show by contradiction that the supremum is ﬁnite. If
C = +1, then for any  > 0 there is a u() 2 U
such that
Q
k u
()
l > . There always exists a   ^  such
that u() 2 U(). Thus, the value maxu2U()
Q
k uk could
become arbitrarily large, which contradicts the assumption
that (14) holds for arbitrary   ^ . This implies C < +1.
Inequality (15) is satisﬁed with equality for all   ^ . Since
u(^ ) 2 U, we have supu2U
Q
k(uk) =
Q
k(^ uk). That is, the
maximum (2) is attained by u(^ ).
Conversely, assume that ^ u is the solution of the product
maximization (2). For any  > 0, we have
max
u2U()
Y
k2K
(uk)  max
u2U
Y
k2K
(uk) =
Y
k2K
(^ uk) : (16)
There exists a ^  for which this inequality is fulﬁlled with
equality, with the maximizer u(^ ) = ^ u. This solution is also
contained in any larger set U() where   ^ . 
Note, that any closed convex comprehensive set U  R++ is
contained in ST only under the additional requirement that U
has no boundary segment parallel to the axis. This is because
parallel boundary segments translate to parallel segments in
the log-transformed image set, which would lead to an image
set which is not strictly convex. However, such segments are
irrelevant because no point on a parallel segment can be the
solution of the product optimization (2). In order to keep the
framework simple, it makes sense to focus on ST . But it
should be noted that the framework also holds for regions
U  R++ with a boundary segment parallel to an axis. So,
the proposed framework truly generalizes the classical game-
theoretical assumption of closed comprehensive convex utility
sets.
4In the next section and in the remainder of this paper, we
will focus on the special case of a log-convex SIR region
S 2 ST . By exploiting properties of the interference coupling,
we are able to characterize existence and uniqueness of an
optimizer (2), respectively (3).
III. LOG-CONVEX INTERFERENCE FUNCTIONS AND
INTERFERENCE COUPLING
The properties stated in Theorem 1 are not necessarily
fulﬁlled. We need to ensure boundedness and existence of an
optimizer, as discussed in Section I-C. To this end, we will
focus on the SIR feasible set S (cf. Section I-B) resulting from
log-convex interference functions.
We will begin by introducing log-convex interference func-
tions along with some examples.
A. Log-Convex Interference Functions
It was shown in [35] that the SIR region (7) is a compact
comprehensive convex set from RK
++ if and only if C() is
a convex interference function, i.e., A1–A3 are fulﬁlled and
I(p) is convex on RK
+.
However, C() is generally not convex, so S is generally
non-convex and unbounded. It is therefore unclear whether or
not the conventional Nash bargaining theory can be applied
to the feasible SIR set S. However, we can exploit that S is
log-convex if the underlying interference functions I1;:::;IK
are log-convex. To this end, we introduce a change of variable
p = expfsg (component-wise exponential).
Deﬁnition 5. A function I : RK
+ 7! R+ is said to be a
log-convex interference function if A1–A3 are fulﬁlled and
in addition I(expfsg) is log-convex on RK.
Let f(s) := I(expfsg). The function f : RK 7! R+ is log-
convex on RK if and only if logf is convex, or equivalently
[36]
f
 
s()

 f(^ s)1 f( s); 8 2 (0;1); ^ s;  s 2 RK ; (17)
where
s() = (1   )^ s +  s ;  2 (0;1) : (18)
Note that the change of variable p = expfsg was already used
by Sung [37] in the context of linear interference functions (see
the following example), and later in [18], [38]–[41].
Some examples of log-convex interference functions are:
Example 1. Linear interference functions
Ik(p) = pTvk; k 2 K ; (19)
where vk 2 RK
+ is a vector of coupling coefﬁcients. All
coupling vectors can be collected in a KK coupling matrix
V = [v1;:::;vK]T : (20)
The function (19) is a log-convex interference function in the
sense of Deﬁnition 5.
Example 2. The coefﬁcients v can adapt to the current inter-
ference situation. An example is the “worst-case interference”
Ik(p) = max
ck2Ck
pTvk(ck); k 2 K : (21)
The parameter ck can stand for some uncertainty, chosen from
a compact uncertainty set Ck. It is used, e.g., in the context of
robust power allocation [42].
The source of uncertainty can be system imperfections or
channel estimation errors. As an example, consider again the
downlink beamforming scenario discussed in the previous
section. In the presence of imperfect channel estimation, the
spatial covariance matrices can be modeled as Rk = ^ Rk+k,
where ^ Rk is the estimated covariance, and k 2 Zk is the
estimation error from a compact uncertainty region Zk. In
order to improve the robustness, the system can be optimized
with respect to the worst-case interference functions
Ik(p) = max
k2Zk
P
l6=k pluH
l ( ^ Rk + k)ul + 2
uH
k ( ^ Rk + k)uk
: (22)
The interference function (22) can be rewritten in the canonical
form (21). Other types of uncertainties, like noise uncertainty
are straightforward extensions of this model.
The function (21), and therefore (22), fulﬁlls A1–A3. Also,
Ik(p) is convex on RK
+, and Ik(es) is log-convex on RK.
Example 3. It was shown in [35] that I(p) is a convex
interference function if and only if there exists a compact
comprehensive convex set W(I)  RK
+, such that
I(p) = max
w2W(I)
wTp : (23)
This is a maximum over linear (thus log-convex) interference
functions, thus I(p) is also a log-convex interference function
in the sense of Deﬁnition 5. Thus, every convex interference
function is a log-convex interference function. Log-convex
interference functions can be regarded as a generalization of
convex interference functions.
Note, that this example includes the function (21) as a
special case. But (23) can also be regarded as the optimum
of a weighted sum-utility maximization problem over a utility
region W with individual weights p1;:::;pK. This example
supports the discussion in Section I-B, where it was claimed
that the applicability of the axiomatic framework A1-A3 is not
restricted to interference in a physical sense.
Example 4. Consider the indicator function C(), as deﬁned
by (6). If the underlying interference functions I1;:::;IK are
log-convex, then C() is a log-convex interference function
in the sense of Deﬁnition 5. This means that C
 
exp(q)

is
log-convex with respect to the substitute variable q = log,
which is the SIR on a logarithmic scale. Since every log-
convex function is convex, it follows that the resulting log-
SIR region (7) is a convex set. This result was shown in [5].
It generalizes previous results on linear interference functions
[37] (see also [38]–[41]).
Example 5. Consider a stochastic matrix W  0, with W1 =
1. We can use W in order to construct log-convex interference
functions
Ik(p) = fk
K Y
l=1
(pl)wkl; fk > 0 : (24)
It was shown in [43] that every log-convex interference func-
tion can be expressed as a maximum over elementary function
5of the type (24). Hence, the analysis of these basic building
blocks is of particular interest.
B. Asymptotic Characterization of Interference Coupling
Consider K log-convex interference functions I1;:::;IK.
the existence and uniqueness of a proportional fair operating
point depends on the interference coupling in the system.
Interference coupling is a well known concept in the context
of linear interference functions (19), for which the mutual
coupling is characterized by a non-negative coupling matrix
W. Modeling interference coupling by such a non-negative
link gain matrix is common in power control theory (see e.g.
[14]). For this case, the problem of proportional fairness was
already successfully analyzed, e.g., in [44], [45].
However, the axiomatic framework A1–A3 is more gen-
eral and allows for adaptive strategies, where interference is
rejected depending on p (see the examples in Section III-A).
This complicates the characterization of interference coupling,
so a new approach is required.
Independent of the actual choice of the power allocation, the
interference coupling can be characterized by an asymptotic
approach.
Deﬁnition 6. The asymptotic coupling matrix is
[AI]kl =
8
<
:
1 if there exists a p > 0 such that
lim!1 Ik(p + el) = +1,
0 otherwise,
(25)
where el is the all-zero vector with the lth component set to
one.
[el]n =
(
1 n = l
0 n 6= l :
(26)
The 1-entries in the kth row of AI mark the positions of the
power components on which Ik depends. Notice that because
of property A2, we have the following property [5].
Lemma 1. If there exists a ^ p > 0 such that lim!1 Ik(^ p +
el) = +1, then
lim
!1
Ik(p + el) = +1 for all p > 0. (27)
Hence, the condition in (25) does not depend on the choice
of p. That is, AI provides a general characterization of
interference coupling for interference functions fulﬁlling A1-
A3. The matrix AI can be regarded as a generalization of the
link gain matrix (20) commonly used in power control theory.
In particular, [AI]kl = 1 , [V ]kl > 0 and [AI]kl = 0 ,
[V ]kl = 0.
This can be further extended to arbitrary convex interference
functions, as discussed in Example 3. Since every convex
interference function can be expressed as (23), it follows that
there exists a W = [w1;:::;wK]T, with wk 2 W(Ik), such
that Ik(p) = wTp for all k. Among all possible matrices W,
if there exists only one matrix such that [V ]kl > 0 then this
implies [AI]kl > 0.
Another interesting interpretation of AI is obtained for the
special log-convex interference function (24) in Example 5.
The coefﬁcient matrix W can be regarded as a coupling
matrix. In particular, [W]kl > 0 , [AI]kl = 0.
C. Behavior for Log-Convex Interference Functions
For the special case of log-convex interference functions the
condition in (25) can be weakened [46].
Lemma 2. For log-convex interference functions we have
AI = D, where
[D]kl =
8
> > <
> > :
1 if there exists a p > 0 such that
Ik(p + el) is not constant for some
values  > 0
0 otherwise.
(28)
The dependency matrix D will play a central role in the
following analysis of the proportionally fair operating point
(9). But before, we need another important property:
Consider an arbitrary row permutation  = [1;:::;K]
applied to the matrix D. This corresponds to a reordering of
the indices of I1;:::;IK, but without changing the indices of
the powers p1;:::;pK. Such a reordering does not affect our
objective function (9). For an arbitrary p > 0 we have
X
k
log
Ik(p)
pk
=
X
k
logIk(p)  
X
k
logpk (29)
=
X
k
log
Ik(p)
pk
: (30)
This follows from the fact that the summands in (29) can be
arranged and combined arbitrarily.
This means that the optimization problem (9) is invari-
ant with respect to permutations of powers or interference
functions. Deﬁning arbitrary permutation matrices P
(1), P
(2),
the permuted dependency matrix ~ D = P
(1)DP
(2) can
equivalently be used in order to characterize the behavior
of proportional fairness. This fundamental observation is the
basis for the following results.
IV. BOUNDEDNESS OF THE COST FUNCTION
Having characterized the interference coupling, we are now
in a position to study the existence of the proportionally fair
inﬁmum PF(I), as deﬁned by (9). That is, we want to show
under which conditions PF(I) >  1. The following simple
example shows that PF(I) can be unbounded.
Example 6. Consider linear interference functions Ik(p) =
[V p]k, k = 1;2;3, with a coupling matrix
V =
2
4
0 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
3
5 : (31)
Without loss of generality, we can scale p such that kpk1 =
p1 + p2 + p3 = 1. Then the cost function becomes
3 X
k=1
log
Ik(p)
pk
= log
 p3
p1p2

: (32)
Choosing p2 = p1 and p3 = 1=n, with n > 1. Since kpk1 = 1,
we have p1 = 1
2   1
2n. Thus,
PF(I) = inf
n>1
log
 1
n   1

=  1 :
6The next Lemma, which will be needed later for the proof
of Theorem 2, shows a connection between boundedness and
the structure of the dependency matrix D.
Deﬁnition 7. We say that K0  K interference functions with
indices 1;:::;K0 depend on a power component with index
l if at least one of these functions depends on this power, i.e.,
there exists a k 2 f1;:::;K0g such that [D]k;l 6= 0.
Lemma 3. If PF(I) >  1, then for every r 2 K,
arbitrary interference functions I1;:::;Ir depend on at
least r components of the power vector p.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there is a
number ^ r and interference functions Ik1;:::;Ik^ r, which only
depend on powers pl1;:::;pln, with n < ^ r. From (30) we
know that interference functions and powers can be permuted
such that I1;:::;I^ r only depend on p1;:::;pn, with n < ^ r.
Consider the vector p(), deﬁned as
[p()]l =
(
; l = 1;:::;n
1; l = n + 1;:::;K ;
where 0 <   1, i.e., p()  1. Axiom A3 implies
Ik
 
p()

 Ik(1). This can be used to write
K X
k=1
log
Ik
 
p()

pk()
=
n X
k=1
log
Ik
 
1


+
^ r X
k=n+1
log
Ik
 
1

1
+
+
K X
k=^ r+1
log
Ik
 
p()

1

n X
k=1
logIk
 
1

+
^ r X
k=n+1
logIk
 
1

+
+ (^ r   n)log +
K X
k=^ r+1
logIk(1) :
Therefore,
PF(I) 
K X
k=1
log
Ik
 
p()

pk()

K X
k=1
logIk
 
1

+ (^ r   n)log :
This holds for all , thus letting  ! 0, it can be observed
that PF(I) is unbounded. 
A. Necessary and Sufﬁcient Condition for Boundedness
Using Lemma 3, the following result is shown.
Theorem 2. Let I1;:::;IK be arbitrary log-convex interfer-
ence functions. If
inf
p>0
X
k2K
log
Ik(p)
pk
>  1 ; (33)
then there exists a row permutation  = [1;:::;K] such
that [D]k;k > 0 for all k = 1;2;:::;K. That is, the permuted
matrix has a positive main diagonal.
Proof. Assume that (33) is fulﬁlled. Consider the function
IK, which depends on LK powers, with indices k
(K) =
[k
(K)
1 ;:::;k
(K)
LK ]. The case LK = 0 is ruled out by the
assumption that there is a p0 > 0 such that I(p0) > 0
(see Section I-C). Consider the lth component k
(K)
l . The
set L(K)(k
(K)
l ) contains the indices m 6= k
(K)
l on which
I1;:::;IK 1 depend. More precisely, L(K)(k
(K)
l ) is the set of
indices m 6= k
(K)
l such that there exists a k 2 f1;2;:::;K  
1g with [D]km 6= 0. Let #L(K)(k
(K)
l ) denote the cardinality
of this set. It follows from Lemma 3 that there exists at least
one ^ l, 1  ^ l  LK, such that
#L(K)(k
(K)
^ l ) = K   1 : (34)
Otherwise K interference functions could not depend on K
powers.
If (34) is fulﬁlled for multiple indices, then we can choose
one. Because of (30) the powers can be arbitrarily permuted.
Thus we can choose a permutation  such that K = k
(K)
^ l .
That is, the interference function IK depends on pK, thus
[D]K;K 6= 0. This component K is now kept ﬁxed. It re-
mains to consider the remaining functions I1;:::;IK 1 which
still depend on all powers p1;:::;pK 1. These powers can
still be permuted arbitrarily.
We continue with the interference function IK 1, which
depends on LK 1 > 0 powers, with indices k
(K 1) =
[k
(K 1)
1 ;:::;k
(K 1)
LK 1 ]. We denote by L(K 1)(k
(K 1)
l ) the set
of indices (excluding K and k
(K 1)
l ) such that there exists a
k 2 f1;2;:::;K   2g with [D]km 6= 0. There exists at least
one ^ l, 1  ^ l  LK 1 (no matter which one) such that
#L(K 1)(k
(K 1)
^ l ) = K   2 : (35)
In analogy to the ﬁrst step, we permute these K   1 powers
such that K 1 = k
(K 1)
^ l . Thus, [D]K 1;K 1 6= 0. This
component is also kept ﬁxed, so we can focus on the remaining
functions I1;:::;IK 2 which depend on p1;:::;pK 2.
By repeating this procedure for all remaining interference
functions, the result follows. 
Theorem 2 states that if PF(I) is bounded then the rows of
D can be permuted such that the resulting matrix has a non-
zero main diagonal. An analogous condition can be formulated
with a column permutation.
Now, the converse can be shown under an additional con-
dition. To this end, consider ek, as deﬁned by (26). Assume
that for arbitrary k;l 2 K,
[D]k;l > 0 =) Ik(el) > 0 : (36)
Under this additional assumption, the existence of a permuted
matrix with positive main diagonal implies the boundedness
of PF(I), as stated by the next theorem.
Theorem 3. Under the additional property (36), the condition
in Theorem 2 is necessary and sufﬁcient.
Proof. Assume that there exists a  such that [D]k;k > 0
for all k = 1;2;:::;K. As shown, this permutation does not
affect our cost function. Properties A2 and A3 imply
Ik(p)  Ik(p  ek) = pk  Ik(ek) = pk  Ck : (37)
7By assumption, Ck > 0 for all k. Thus,
X
k
log
Ik(p)
pk

X
k
logCk >  1 ;
which completes the proof. 
Note, that property (36) is always fulﬁlled, e.g., for linear
interference functions (19) or worst-case interference functions
(21). However, it can not be generalized to arbitrary log-
convex interference functions (see e.g. the example (24), for
which we always have Ik(el) = 0).
B. Elementary Log-Convex Interference Functions
We will now illustrate these results by discussing the par-
ticular log-convex interference function (24), which is based
on a stochastic coefﬁcient matrix W  0. The proportionally
fair objective is
K X
k=1
log
Ik(p)
pk
= log
Q
l(pl)(
P
k wkl) 
Q
k fk Q
k pk

: (38)
We say that W is stochastic if W1 = 1. For this special inter-
ference a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for boundedness
can be derived from W.
Theorem 4. For interference functions (24), the inﬁmum (9)
is bounded if and only if W is doubly stochastic, i.e.,
PF(I) := inf
p>0
X
k
log
Ik(p)
pk
>  1 , W
T1 = 1 :
(39)
Proof. Assume W
T1 = 1, i.e.,
P
k wkl = 1 for all l. Then it
can be observed from (38) that, independently of the choice
of p, we have
K X
k=1
log
Ik(p)
pk
= log
 K Y
k=1
fk

>  1 :
Conversely, assume that PF(I) >  1. The proof is by
contradiction: assume that W
T1 6= 1. Since W1 = 1, we
have K =
P
k(
P
l wkl) =
P
l(
P
k wkl). So W
T1 6= 1
implies the existence of a column index ^ l such that
P
k wk^ l =
^ w^ l > 1.
Now, consider a sequence p(n) = [p1(n);:::;pK(n)]T,
deﬁned as
pl(n) =
(
1=n ; l = ^ l
1
K 1(1   1
n) ; otherwise.
(40)
Using (38), (40), and
P
l6=^ l
P
k wkl = K   ^ w^ l, we have
K X
k=1
log
Ik
 
p(n)

pk(n)
= log

  1
n
 ^ w^ l 1


1
K 1(1  1
n)
1  ^ w^ l

Y
k
fk

:
(41)
Letting n ! 1, it can be observed that the argument of
the log-function tends to zero, so (41) tends to  1. This
contradicts the assumption, thus concluding the proof. 
This result shows that without the requirement Ik(ek) >
0 in (37), nothing can be said about the existence of a
proportionally fair minimum (33). In particular, it does not
depend on D. If W is chosen such that W
T1 6= 1, then
no minimum exists, even if [D]kl = 1 for k 6= l. Thus,
[D]k;k > 0 is a necessary condition, but not sufﬁcient in
general. This will become clear by the following example.
Example 7. Consider log-convex interference functions (24)
with a coefﬁcient matrix
W =
2
6
4
0 1 0
1
2 0 1
2
1
2
1
2 0
3
7
5 : (42)
We have W
T1 = [1 3
2
1
2]T 6= 1, so the condition in
Theorem 4 is not fulﬁlled. With I1(p) = p2, I2(p) =
(p1)1=2  (p3)1=2, and I3(p) = (p1)1=2  (p2)1=2, we have
inf
p>0
3 X
k=1
log
Ik(p)
pk
= inf
p>0
log
(p2p3)1=2
p3
=  1 : (43)
So the cost function is not bounded, even though there exists
a permutation P
(1) such that the main diagonal of DP
(1)
is non-zero. This shows that the additional condition (36) is
important and cannot be removed, even for this relatively
simple interference function. Only then, the condition in
Theorem 2 is necessary and sufﬁcient.
V. EXISTENCE OF A PROPORTIONALLY FAIR OPTIMIZER
In the previous section it was shown that the existence
PF(I) >  1 is connected with the positivity of the main di-
agonal of a permuted dependency matrix. Now, we investigate
under which condition the inﬁmum PF(I) >  1 is actually
attained by a power allocation p > 0. The next example shows
that this is not always fulﬁlled, even not for the simple linear
interference functions (19).
Example 8. Consider linear interference functions Ik(p) =
[V p]k, k = 1;2;3, with a coupling matrix
V =
2
4
0 1 0
1 0 1
1 1 0
3
5 : (44)
We have
PF(I) = inf
p>0
3 X
k=1
log
Ik(p)
pk
=  log
h p1  p3
(p1 + p3)(p1 + p2)
i
  log
hp1  p3
p3  p1
i
= 0 (45)
We can choose special power p1 = , p2 = 2, and p3 =
1      2, such that
3 X
k=1
log
Ik(p)
pk
=  log
(1      2)
(1   2)(1 + )
:
This tends to zero as  ! 0, Thus,
PF(I) = inf
p>0
3 X
k=1
log
Ik(p)
pk
 0 : (46)
Combining (45) and (46) it follows that PF(I) = 0 >  1.
8Now, we study whether this inﬁmum is attained. Assume
that there exists an optimizer p > 0, then
0 = log
I1(p)
p
1
+ log
I2(p)
p
2
+ log
I3(p)
p
3
=  log
h p
1  p
3
(p
1 + p
3)(p
1 + p
2)
i
>  log
hp
1  p
3
p
3p
1
i
= 0 (47)
which contradicts the assumption, thus the inﬁmum PF(I) =
0 is not attained.
The matrix (44) is even irreducible, thus each boundary
point , with C() = 1, can be attained. That is, there exists a
^ p := ^ p() such that k = ^ pk=[V ^ p]k, for all k 2 K. However,
there exists no  > 0, C() = 1, such that
PF(I) =
X
k2K
log
1

k
:
More properties of this particular example (44) will be dis-
cussed later in Section VI-B.
Now, consider arbitrary log-convex interference functions
I1;:::;IK, whose coupling is characterized by the depen-
dency matrix D, as deﬁned by (28). We may assume, without
loss of generality, that after simultaneous permutations of rows
and columns, D is reduced to canonical form (see e.g. [28,
p. 75]), with irreducible blocks along the diagonal. Then,
D =
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
D
(1;1) 0 0 ::: 0
... 0 ::: 0
0 D
(i;i) 0 ::: 0
D
(i+1;1) ::: D
(i+1;i) D
(i+1;i+1) 0 0
. . . :::
. . .
. . .
... 0
D
(N;1) ::: D
(N;i) D
(N;2) ::: D
(N;N)
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
(48)
The matrix has N irreducible blocks along the main diagonal.
The diagonal square blocks D
(n) := D
(n;n) have a minimum
dimension of two because every user is assumed to depend on
at least one other user (see Section I-C). If D is irreducible,
then it consists of one single block. We say that D is block-
irreducible if
D =
"
D
(1) 0
...
0 D
(m)
#
;
where all sub-blocks D
(l) are irreducible.
The index set of transmitters on which user k depends is
said to be the dependency set
L(k) = fl 2 K : [D]kl = 1g : (49)
We also need the following monotonicity property.
Deﬁnition 8 (strict monotonicity). Ik(p) is said to be strictly
monotonic if p(1)  p(2), with p
(1)
l > p
(2)
l for some l 2 L(k),
implies Ik(p(1)) > Ik(p(2)).
In other words, Ik(p) is strictly increasing in at least one
power component. We will now use this property in order to
derive a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence
of a proportionally fair optimizer.
Theorem 5. Let I1;:::;IK be log-convex interference func-
tions such that (36) is fulﬁlled. They are also strictly mono-
tonic. Then there exists a proportionally fair optimizer ^ p > 0
if and only if there exist permutation matrices P
(1), P
(2),
such that ^ D := P
(1)DP
(2) is block-irreducible and its main
diagonal is strictly positive.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix. 
Having characterized the existence of a proportionally fair
solution of problem (9), we will now study its uniqueness in
the next section.
VI. UNIQUENESS OF THE PROPORTIONALLY FAIR
SOLUTION
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the inter-
ference functions I1;:::;IK are log-convex in the sense of
Deﬁnition 5. By the log-transformation, the line segment s(),
as deﬁned by (18), is transformed to
p() = ^ p
1    p ; (50)
So with (17) it is clear that Ik(es) is log-convex if and only
if
Ik
 
p()


 
Ik(^ p)
1 

 
Ik( p)

;  2 (0;1) : (51)
A. Uniqueness for an Existing Optimizer
Assume that there exists an optimizer for the problem of
proportional fairness (9). We now show under which condition
this optimizer is unique. To this end, we analyze the cost
function
G(s) =
X
k2K
log
Ik(es)
esk ; on RK ; (52)
where we have used the substitution p = es.
In order to show uniqueness of the optimizer (9), it is
sufﬁcient to show that the cost function G(s) is strictly convex.
Since p = es is a one-to-one mapping, uniqueness of an
optimizer s implies uniqueness of the original problem (9).
Note, that by assuming the existence of an optimizer, the
analysis is simpliﬁed. Also, it is not necessary to show strict
convexity of the region itself (this will be done later in
Section VII).
We start with the following lemma, which will be needed
later for Theorem 6.
Lemma 4. The function G(s), as deﬁned by (52) is strictly
convex if and only if for arbitrary vectors ^ p;  p 2 RK
++, with
^ p 6=  p,  2 R++, there exists a 0 2 (0;1) and at least one
index k0 such that
Ik0
 
p(0)

<
 
Ik0(^ p)
1 0 
 
Ik0( p)
0 : (53)
9Proof. Assume that (53) holds for k0. With ^ p = e^ s and  p =
e s, we have
G
 
s(0)

=
X
k2Knk0
log
Ik(es(0))
esk(0) + log
Ik0(es(0))
esk0(0)
 (1   0)
X
k2Knk0
log
Ik(e^ s)
e^ sk +
+ 0
X
k2Knk0
log
Ik(e s)
e sk + log
Ik0(es(0))
esk0(0)
< (1   0)
X
k2K
log
Ik(e^ s)
e^ sk + 0
X
k2K
log
Ik(e s)
e sk
= (1   0)G(^ s) + 0G( s) ; (54)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the convexity of
G
 
s(0)

[27], and the second strict inequality is due to (53).
Conversely, assume that G is strictly convex. Suppose that
there is ^ s;  s 2 RK and 0 2 (0;1), such that for all k 2 K,
Ik
 
es(0)
=
 
Ik(^ s)
1 0  (
 
Ik( s)
0 : (55)
With (55), we have
G
 
s(0)

=
X
k=K
log
 
Ik(e^ s)
1 0 
 
Ik(e s)
0
e(1 0)^ sk  e(0) sk
= (1   0)G(^ s) + 0G( s) ; (56)
which contradicts the assumption of strict convexity, thus
concluding the proof. 
Note that, if (53) holds for a 0 2 (0;1), then it holds for all
 2 (0;1). This is a direct consequence of the log-convexity
of Ik0.
In order to show the next Theorem 6, we need the following
three Lemmas 5, 6, and 7, which build on each other. Using
the dependency set (49) we introduce the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 9 (strict log-convexity). A log-convex interference
function Ik is said to be strictly log-convex if for all ^ p;  p 2
RK
++, with ^ pl 6=  pl for at least one l 2 Lk, we have
Ik
 
p()

<
 
Ik(^ p)
1 

 
Ik( p)

; (57)
where p() is deﬁned by (50).
We have the following result.
Lemma 5. Let Ik be strictly log-convex interference functions
in the sense of Deﬁnition 9. For all  2 (0;1), we have
Ik
 
p()

=
 
Ik(^ p)
1 

 
Ik( p)

(58)
if and only if for all l 2 L(k),
^ pl =  pl ;  > 0 : (59)
Proof. Assume that (59) holds. We have
pl() = ^ p
1 
l   p
l = 1    pl ; 8l 2 L(k) ; (60)
and thus
Ik
 
p()

= 1   Ik( p) : (61)
With Ik(^ p) = Ik( p), we have
Ik
 
p()

=
 
Ik(^ p)
1 

Ik( p)
 
Ik( p)
1 
=
 
Ik(^ p)
1 

 
Ik( p)

: (62)
Conversely, assume that (58) is fulﬁlled. Then strict log-
convexity implies ^ pl =  pl for all l 2 L(k). 
Based on Lemma 5 we can show the following result.
Lemma 6. Let Ik be strictly log-convex interference functions.
Assume that DD
T is irreducible. For arbitrary ^ p;  p 2 RK
++
and 0 2 (0;1), the equality
Ik
 
p(0)

=
 
Ik(^ p)
1 0 
 
Ik( p)
0 ; (63)
holds for all k 2 K, if and only if
^ p =  p ; 8 2 R++ : (64)
Proof. If (64) is fulﬁlled, then also (63) is fulﬁlled for all
k 2 K.
Conversely, assume that (63) is fulﬁlled, then it follows from
Lemma 5 that
^ pl = (k)   pl ; 8l 2 L(k) ; (65)
where (k) 2 R is associated with the kth user. If l 2 L(k1)\
L(k2), then (65) is fulﬁlled for both k1 and k2, i.e.,
(k1) = (k2) :
Since DD
T is irreducible, for each k there is a sequence of
indices k0 = 1;k1;:::;kr = k, such that
L(ks) \ L(ks+1) 6= ; (66)
for s = 0;:::;r   1. It can be concluded that
(1) = (k1) = (k) ; (67)
which shows (64). 
With Lemma 6 we can show the following result. To this
end we need log-convexity, as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 9.
Lemma 7. Let I1;:::;IK be strictly log-convex in the sense
of Deﬁnition 9. There is at least one k0 2 K such that the
strict inequality (53) is fulﬁlled for ^ p 6=  p, if and only if
DD
T is irreducible.
Proof. From Lemma 6 we know hat if DD
T is irreducible,
and ^ p 6=  p, for arbitrary ^ p;  p 2 RK
++, then there exists a
k0 2 K and a 0 such that (53) holds.
Conversely, assume that (53) is fulﬁlled. The proof is by
contradiction. Suppose that DD
T is not irreducible. Then
there are at least two indices k1;k2 2 K, which are not
connected. Let K(1), K(2) denote the sets of k which are
connected with k1, k2, respectively. Then K(1) \ K(2) = ;.
Consider a third set K(3) = Kn(K(1) [ K(2)). We can have
K(3) 6= ;.
10Consider a vector p(1), and positive scalars c(1), c(2), with
c(1) 6= c(2). We deﬁne a vector p(2) such that
p
(2)
k =
8
> <
> :
p
(1)
k if k 2 K(3)
c(1)p
(1)
k if k 2 K(1)
c(2)p
(1)
k if k 2 K(2)
(68)
Since c(1) 6= c(2), we have p(1) 6= p(2). Now, consider
pk(1
2) := (p
(1)
k )1=2  (p
(2)
k )1=2 ; 8k 2 K : (69)
For k 2 K(3) we have L(k) \ K(1) = ; and L(k) \ K(2) = ;.
Therefore, Ik
 
p(1
2)

= Ik(p(1)) = Ik(p(2), and thus
Ik
 
p(1
2)

=
 
Ik(p(1))
1=2

 
Ik(p(2)1=2
: (70)
For k 2 K(1) we have p
(2)
l = c(1)p
(1)
l for all l 2 L(k), thus
Ik
 
p(1
2)

=
 
Ik(p(1))
1=2

 
Ik(p(2)1=2
: (71)
The same result can be shown for k 2 K(2).
Thus, (71) holds for all k 2 K. However, this contradicts the
assumed strict convexity of the interference function. Hence,
DD
T must be irreducible. 
Theorem 6. Let I1;:::;IK be strictly log-convex in the sense
of Deﬁnition 9. The cost function G(s), as deﬁned by (52), is
strictly convex if and only if DD
T is irreducible.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 4 and Lemma 7. 
B. Combination of Results
The results of Section VI-A show that if an optimizer exists,
then the uniqueness of the solution is characterized by the
structure of the matrix DD
T. However, DD
T alone is not
sufﬁcient for the existence of a proportionally fair optimizer.
This is shown by the next example.
Example 9. Consider the coupling matrix V , as deﬁned by
(44). The matrix V is irreducible. The product
V V
T =
2
4
1 0 1
0 2 1
1 1 2
3
5
is irreducible as well. The function
P3
k=1 log
[V ^ p]k
^ pk is strictly
convex if we substitute p = es. The resulting SIR region is
strictly log-convex according to Theorem 6.
Nevertheless, the previous Example 8 shows that no opti-
mizer exists. This is because the requirements in Theorem 5
are not satisﬁed.
Thus far, we have provided conditions for existence (The-
orem 5) and strict convexity of the cost function 6. Next, we
show how these results are connected and how they can be
combined.
Lemma 8. Let I1;:::;IK be log-convex interference func-
tions as speciﬁed in Theorem 5. Assume that there exist
matrices P
(1), P
(2), such that ^ D = P
(1)DP
(2) has a
positive main diagonal. If ^ D is irreducible then ^ D ^ D
T
is as
well irreducible.
Proof. Deﬁning ^ D
0
:= ^ D ^ D
T
, we have
[ ^ D
0
]kl =
K X
n=1
[ ^ D]kn[ ^ D
T
]nl =
K X
n=1
[ ^ D]kn[ ^ D]ln : (72)
Consider the summand n = l. We have [ ^ D
0
]kl  [ ^ D]kl[ ^ D]ll 
0. By assumption of a positive main diagonal, we have [ ^ D]ll >
0. Thus, [ ^ D]kl > 0 implies that [ ^ D
0
]kl > 0 for an arbitrary
choice of indices k;l. Hence, irreducibility of ^ D implies
irreducibility of ^ D. 
Using Lemma 8, it is possible to provide a necessary
and sufﬁcient condition under which the proportionally fair
optimizer is unique.
Theorem 7. Let I1;:::;IK be log-convex interference func-
tions as speciﬁed in Theorem 5. Then problem (9) has a
unique optimizer ^ p > 0, k^ pk1 = 1, if and only if there are
permutation matrices P
(1), P
(2), such that ^ D = P
(1)DP
(2)
is irreducible and has a positive main diagonal.
Proof. Assume that a unique optimizer ^ p > 0 exists, it follows
from Theorem 5 that ^ D is block-irreducible. That is, ^ D is
block-diagonal with r  1 irreducible blocks ^ D
(1)
;:::; ^ D
(r)
.
The optimization infp>0
P
k log(Ik(p)=pk) is reduced to r
independent sub-problems with the respective dependency
matrices. This leads to proportionally fair power allocations
^ p
(1);:::; ^ p
(r). Uniqueness of ^ p implies r = 1, i.e. ^ D consists
of a single irreducible block. To show this, suppose that r > 1.
Since each power vector can be arbitrarily scaled, every vector
^ p =
2
6
4
1  ^ p
(1)
. . .
r  ^ p
(r)
3
7
5; with  = [1;:::;r] > 0
is proportionally fair. Thus, ^ p is not unique. This contradicts
the hypothesis and implies irreducibility.
Conversely, assume that there is an irreducible matrix ^ D
with a positive main diagonal. Since the requirements of
Theorem 5 are fulﬁlled, we know that problem (9) has an
optimizer ^ p > 0. It remains to show that ^ p > 0, with
k^ pk1 = 1, is unique. From Lemma 8, we know that ^ D ^ D
T
is
irreducible. We have
^ D ^ D
T
= P
(1)DP
(2)(P
(2))TD
T(P
(1))T
= P
(1)DD
T(P
(1))T : (73)
Thus, DD
T = (P
(1))T ^ D ^ D
T
P
(1) is irreducible as well. It
follows from Theorem 6 that the cost function function G(s),
as deﬁned by (52), is strictly convex. Since the function expfg
is strictly monotonic, it can be concluded that the optimizer
^ p > 0 is unique. 
VII. EQUIVALENCE OF NASH BARGAINING AND
PROPORTIONAL FAIRNESS
In the previous section we have studied the existence and
uniqueness of a proportionally fair optimizer directly, without
the need of showing strict log-convexity of the region. Now,
we use the results of Section II-B, where the Nash bargaining
11theory was extended to a certain class of non-compact sets
ST . If the SIR feasible set is contained in ST , and if an
optimizer exists, then we know that it is the unique NBS.
If an optimizer exists, then uniqueness and equivalence to
NBS follows as in the previous section, where strict convexity
of the cost function was exploited. Note, that the connection
between strict convexity of the SIR region and strict convexity
of the PF cost function (52) is not obvious. The difﬁculty of
such connections can be observed from the indicator function
C used in the deﬁnition of the feasible SIR set (7). Every
convex interference function is associated with a convex
comprehensive sub-level set from RK
++. However, not every
such convex set can be expressed as a sub-level set of a convex
interference function.
For the problem at hand, boundary points ^  with C(^ ) = 1
need not be achievable. In order to guarantee the existence of
a ^ p > 0 such that
1 = C(^ ) =
^ kIk(^ p)
^ pk
(74)
we need the additional requirement that D is irreducible. This
ensures the existence of a power allocation p > 0 such that
(74) is fulﬁlled [46]. Note, that this solution is not required
to be unique. An SIR boundary point may be associated
with different power vectors. However, different SIR boundary
points will always be associated with different power vectors.
Theorem 8. Let I1;:::;IK be strictly log-convex and strictly
monotone interference functions. Let D and DD
T be irre-
ducible. Then the SIR region S, as deﬁned by (7), is contained
in ST .
Proof. Consider arbitrary ^ ,   with ^  6=   (at least one
component). Since D is irreducible, the points ^ ,   are
associated with power vectors ^ p,  p, respectively, as in (74),
such that ^ p 6= c p. Next, consider p(), as deﬁned by (50). We
have
k() 
pk()
Ik
 
p()
 ; 8k 2 K : (75)
From Lemma 7 we know that there is at least one k0 such
that inequality (75) is strict. Since DD
T is irreducible, we
can successively reduce the powers of users for which strict
inequality holds. This reduces interference of other users,
which in turn can reduce their power. The irreducibility of
DD
T ensures that all users beneﬁt from this approach, so
after a ﬁnite number of steps, we can ﬁnd a power vector
~ p > 0 such that
k() <
~ pk
Ik(~ p)
; 8k 2 K : (76)
Thus, C
 
()

< 1, which proves strict convexity. 
Note that strict convexity of the SIR set does not imply that
the PF problem (9) has an optimizer p > 0. The Example 9
in the previous section shows that D and DD
T can both be
irreducible, however no optimizer exists if the conditions in
Theorem 5 are not fulﬁlled.
The following theorem links the previous results on the
existence and uniqueness of a proportional fair optimizer with
the Nash bargaining framework derived in Section II-B.
Theorem 9. Let I1;:::;IK be strictly log-convex and strictly
monotone interference functions, and let D and DD
T be
irreducible. There is a unique optimizer ^ p > 0 to the problem
of proportional fairness (9), with an associated SIR vector
^ , if and only if there is a single-valued solution outcome '
satisfying the Nash axioms WPO, SYM, IIA, STC, and ' = ^ .
Proof. This follows from Theorems 1 and 8. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The classical assumption for Nash bargaining and propor-
tional fairness is a compact comprehensive convex utility set.
In this paper we have shown that this can be generalized to
certain strictly log-convex and non-compact sets. This result
broadens the class of utility sets for which Nash bargaining
and proportionally fair resource allocation can be applied.
Extensions to non-convex utility sets are especially important
for wireless system, where the structure of the utility set can
depend on interference in a complicated way.
In this paper, we focus on the SIR region resulting from
log-convex interference functions. This region is log-convex,
but not always strictly log-convex. Moreover, existence and
uniqueness of an optimizer is generally not guaranteed.
Different aspects of this problem are studied. It turns out
that the existence and uniqueness of a proportional fair power
allocation is completely determined by the structure of the
dependency matrix D, which characterizes the interference
coupling for a given framework of axiomatic interference
framework. The results show that only the “combinatorial
structure” of D matters, not the actual strength of the coupling
coefﬁcients.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Assume that, after suitable permutations, ^ D is block-
irreducible and [ ^ D]kk > 0 for all k = 1;2;:::;K. We want
to show that this implies the existence of an optimizer of (9).
To this end, we ﬁrst discuss the simpler case where ^ D is
irreducible. Then, this is extended to block-irreducibility.
Since (36) is fulﬁlled by assumption, Theorem 3 implies
that PF(I) >  1, thus for every  > 0 there exists a vector
p() > 0 such that
X
k
log
Ik
 
p()

pk()
 PF(I) +  : (77)
Since PF(I) is invariant with respect to a scaling of p(),
it can be assumed that maxk pk() = 1. There exists a zero
sequence fngn2N and a p  0, with maxk p
k = 1, such that
lim
n!1
p(n) = p :
We now show by contradiction that p > 0. Assume that this
is not fulﬁlled, then p has r zero components. Because of
(30), we can simultaneously permute rows and columns such
that
lim
n!1pl(n) =
(
0; l = 1;:::;r
p
l > 0; l = r + 1;:::;K :
(78)
12This reordering corresponds to a multiplication PDP
T with
a suitable permutation matrix P, which does not change the
properties of the matrix D (irreducibility and a positive main
diagonal). The ﬁrst r components of p(n) tend to zero, so
log
 
C=pk(n)

, k = 1;:::;r, tends to inﬁnity for C > 0.
That is,
X
k
log
Ik
 
p(n)

pk(n)
 PF(I) + n
can only be fulﬁlled if
lim
n!1
Ik
 
p(n)

= 0; k = 1;:::;r : (79)
Using em, we have
Ik
 
p(n)

 Ik
 
p(n)  em

= Ik(em)  pm(n) : (80)
Combining (79) and (80) yields
0 = lim
n!1
Ik
 
p(n)

 Ik(em)  p
m; m = r + 1;:::;K ;
k = 1;:::;r :
Since p
m > 0, m = r + 1;:::;K, and Ik(em)  0 by
assumption, it follows that Ik(em) = 0 for m = r + 1:::K
and k = 1;:::;r. Consequently, I1;:::;Ir do not depend
on pr+1;:::;pK. This means that D is reducible, which
contradicts the assumption. Thus,
lim
n!1
p(n) = p > 0 :
In [5] it was shown that the interference functions I1;:::;IK
are continuous on RK
++, so
PF(I) 
X
k
log
Ik(p)
p
k
= lim
n!1
X
k
log
Ik
 
p(n)

pk(n)
 PF(I) :
(81)
This shows that the inﬁmum PF(I) is achieved by p > 0.
It remains to show that the same result also follows if
D is block-irreducibility. Assume that D is block-irreducible
and has a strictly positive main diagonal. The l-th diagonal
block has the dimension Kl  Kl. We have
Pm
l=1 Kl = K.
Associated with the lth sub-block are interference functions
I
(l)
k , with k = 1;:::;Kl, depending on the respective power
components. We have
inf
p>0
X
k
log
Ik(p)
pk
=
m X
l=1
PF(I(l)) ; (82)
where PF(I(l)) = inf
p2R
Kl
++
Kl X
k=1
log
I
(l)
k (p)
pk
: (83)
Since the blocks D
(l) are irreducible and have a positive main
diagonal, we know from the ﬁrst part of the proof that there
exists a ^ p
(l) 2 R
Kl
++ such that
PF(I(l)) =
Kl X
k=1
log
I
(l)
k (^ p
(l))
^ p
(l)
k
:
Deﬁning ^ p =
" ^ p
(1)
. . .
^ p
(m)
#
we have
PF(I) =
m X
l=1
PF(I(l)) =
K X
k=1
log
Ik(^ p)
^ pk
; (84)
which completes the ﬁrst part of the proof.
In order to show the converse, assume that there exists
an optimal proportionally fair vector ^ p > 0 which achieves
PF(I) >  1. Let D be the dependency matrix, which can
be arranged such that its main diagonal is strictly positive. The
existence of such a permutation follows from PF(I) >  1
(see Theorem 2). The proof is by contradiction. Assume that
D is not block-irreducible, i.e., there exists a permutation P 1
such that
P 1DP
T
1 =
2
6
6
4
~ D
(1)
0
. . .
...
~ D
(r;m)
::: ~ D
(m)
3
7
7
5 = ~ DI :
Since D has a positive main diagonal, also ~ DI has a
positive diagonal. Let ~ p = P 1^ p and [~ I1;:::; ~ IK]T =
P 1[I1;:::;IK]T, then
inf
p>0
K X
k=1
~ Ik(p)
pk
=
K X
k=1
log
~ Ik(~ p)
~ pk
= PF(~ I) = PF(I) :
Now, consider the ﬁrst block ~ D
(1)
2 R
K1K1
+ with interfer-
ence functions ~ I
(1)
1 ;:::; ~ I
(1)
K1, depending on a power vector
~ p
(1), given as the ﬁrst K1 components of ~ p. This block does
not receive interference, so
K1 X
k=1
log
~ I
(1)
k (~ p
(1))
~ p
(1)
k
= PF(~ I(1)) = inf
p2R
K1
++
K1 X
k=1
log
~ I
(1)
k (p)
pk
:
Now, consider the second block ~ D
(2)
2 R
K2K2
+ . If ~ D
(1;2)
=
0, then
K2 X
k=1
log
~ I
(2)
k (~ p
(2))
~ p
(2)
k
= PF(~ I(2)) = inf
p2R
K2
++
K2 X
k=1
log
~ I
(2)
k (p)
pk
:
(85)
If D
(1;2) 6= 0, then at least one of the interference functions
~ I
(2)
k (p), 1  k  K2, depends on at least one ~ p
(1)
l ,
l = 1;:::;K1. By scaling   ~ p
(1), 0 <  < 1, optimum
PF(~ I(1)) remains unaffected. However, the interference to
the second block would be reduced because of the assumed
strict monotonicity. So it would be possible to construct a new
vector  p, with  p  ~ p, which achieves a better value
K X
k=1
log
Ik( p)
 pk
<
K X
k=1
log
Ik(~ p)
~ pk
= PF(I) :
However, this contradicts the assumption that ~ p is an opti-
mizer. It can be concluded that D is block-irreducible, with a
strictly positive main diagonal.
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